Plato's Lysis: The Structural Problem by Robinson, David B.
Plato's Lysis:
The Structural Problem
DAVID B. ROBINSON
The Lysis is one of five short Platonic dialogues which address
themselves entirely to a question of definition. Besides the Lysis these
dialogues are the Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major and Euthyphro; all
of these ask a question of the type "What is x?" and make this
question their sole concern (unlike one or two longer dialogues in
which a question of this type appears in conjunction with other
questions of a different type). All these five dialogues were put by
Ritter on the grounds of style into the earliest of his three groups
of Plato's works; Ritter's establishment of these three groups' can be
followed with reasonable confidence, and his placing of these five
dialogues may be taken to be confirmed by Xenophon's and Aristotle's
statements that Socrates had been interested in problems of definition.
Plato in writing these dialogues each consisting solely of a search for
a definition was no doubt following up the interest of his master.
This is not to say that either the substance or the method of the
argument in these dialogues is directly derived from Socrates himself;
that is something we shall never know.
We shall never know either whether Plato wrote these five dialogues
deliberately as a group. Were they meant to complement each other
and provide a continuous study of methods of definition? Or was the
attack on certain concepts by means of a direct search for their
definitions simply a device which Plato returned to on separate
occasions when one or other of these concepts aroused his attention
' C. Ritter, Platon (Munich 1910), Vol. 1, pp. 236-37.
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for its own sake? The truth I think must lie somewhere between
these alternatives; Plato was both genuinely anxious to investigate
these concepts for their own sakes by discovering their definitions,
and also at the same time consciously experimenting with methods
of approaching satisfactory definitions. For this reason each of these
dialogues would be best studied not only in conjunction with other
places where Plato discusses the same concept, but also in conjunction
with the other definition-seeking dialogues.
It seems possible that some traces of a development in Plato's
conscious conception of definition might be discovered; if this were
possible it would provide some alternative to Ritter's later "stylistic"
attempt to subdivide his previously established first group of dia-
logues.^ Ritter himself was very tentative about this further attempt;
and it is certainly not as trustworthy as his broader division. But I
remain very tentative too^— the task of taking each dialogue strictly
on its own and estimating precisely how much it says for itself is
necessarily prior to any possibility of comparing dialogues.
The most obvious similarity of general structure between these
dialogues is that, though each attempts to discover a definition of a
particular concept, none of them succeeds; each of them after asking
"what is X?" concludes with the admission "But we have not been
able to find out what x is." The regularity with which this conclusion,
or lack of conclusion, is reached and frankly announced makes it
hard to believe that Plato quite simply viewed his attempts at definition
as one after another dogged by failure. Plato is therefore charged
with the crime of Socrates; he is held to have been ironical, and to
have withheld from us his real thoughts. Those whom Socrates
refuted assumed that Socrates himself knew the right answer but
would not reveal it. Readers of the "aporetic" dialogues assume that
Plato was not sincere in saying that he had failed to obtain a particular
definition, that he must have had in mind a satisfactory definition
which for one reason or another he does not state. Now those who
accused Socrates of irony were wrong; Socrates in his earnest search
^ C. Ritter, "Unterabteilungen innerhalb der zeitlich ersten Gruppe Platonischer
Schriften," Hermes 70 (1935), pp. 1-30.
^ Two points might be made: (1) Despite their final aporiai, Lys., Lack, and Charm.
seem more seriously concerned to offer positive suggestions towards defining their
subjects— friendship, courage and self-knowledge— than Euthyphro and Hippias Major
towards theirs; the latter pair seem to make negative points their main business
throughout; (2) Lysis contains no methodological remarks other than 2 13d 1-2 and
the final sentence. The other dialogues are all richer in this respect, and Euth. and
Hippias Major admit terminology such as idia, irapadayfia, ovaia and iradoc,. This
disinclines me to follow those who put the Lysis late in the first period; viewed purely
as a definition-dialogue it might rather be the earliest of the five.
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for the truth was passionately sincere in asserting his own ignorance.
Socrates of course was not a skeptic, but Socratic ignorance was as
conscious and as thorough-going a philosophical attitude as Cartesian
"doubt." Socrates was fully able to face the possibility that every
suggestion he had so far heard was open to serious difficulty. Are we
then perhaps also wrong in assuming that Plato's negative conclusions
are due to irony on his part? It is perfectly possible that the Platonic
dialogues ending in aporia ought to be taken by the letter to mean
what they say, namely that though a number of definitions may be
suggested, serious objections stand in the way of all of them. Plato
wrote much more positive-seeming dialogues at some periods later
in his life; but that is no reason why his early aporiai may not have
been genuine. Estimating the degree of irony in Plato's works is of
course a well-known and very wide-ranging problem. I merely restate
it here because I suspect that for these five dialogues a contribution
to solving it might be obtained from the examination I have already
asked for of Plato's theory of definition. I suspect it would be found
that Plato set standards for acceptable definitions which made them
genuinely difficult to discover, and that the negative conclusions were
due not to irony but to the rigor of Plato's demands.
This however may seem to promise more than I have to offer. I
shall concentrate in this paper on the Lysis alone, which asks ri eariv
TO (t)iXou; General conclusions will have to be preceded by detailed
discussion of how Plato attacks this particular concept. To plunge
then in medias res —
For a few moments we must be lexicographers and attend quite
simply to the meaning of the words (fyiXelv, 4>iXoc, and (t>LXLa as they
occur in Greek outside Plato and especially outside the Lysis."^
Let us start with the verb (f)LXdv. In the first of its normal senses
this is a fairly usual word for "liking" persons. It can denote quite
strong affection, but it is clearly weaker than epav (Xen. Hiero 2,
ware ov ixbvov (J)lXolo ocv aXXa koX epujo), and is without any suggestion
of sexual attraction. On the other hand it may be quite weak and
mean only to be politically "on the side of."
The second main sense is rather different; (j)LXelv can be the word
for being fond of, practising or pursuing certain activities; being fond
of (and indulging in) banqueting and song; or rather differently,
making a practice of certain kinds of behavior— aiaxpoKepbaa, for
^ A fuller lexicography of 4>i\oc, will be provided elsewhere.
' E.g. Homer, Od. XIV. 83; Theognis 67, 385, 739; Sappho 68. 25; Pindar, Pyth.
9. 9; Soph., Ant. 312, 1056, 1059. Note here and below that to parallel some of
Plato's uses of ^iktlv and 0iXoi; one has to turn to poetic usage.
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Nearly all cases ot <l)L\eli> are covered by these two senses; but
rather rarely 0tXeij/ can denote general approval of types or classes
of people and things. Archilochus says ov <t>LK€(ji /xeyav aTpaTrjyop—
"I don't like a tall general." Simonides couples ^iXfoj with lizaivrnn.:
TOV<:i 5' eiraiprjixL Kal 0iXcaJ, €K<hv oarLq tpbrf nrjdev aioxpov.^
The rather surprising gap among the normal uses of <t)iX€tv is that
it does not seem ever to mean "to like" individual, particular objects.
In English one says "I like that picture" of the particular picture on
the wall; this in Greek could not be 0iXaj rrivde ttjv ypa(f)'f]v, unless
perhaps the picture was of a beloved person. (pi-Xelv is certainly not
the word for commonplace "liking" of things. This might perhaps
rather be apicK^i ixoi.
Now to turn to the adjective (f)iXoq. Here we have to deal not only
with a range of varying meanings and applications, but also with
three logically distinct senses marking active, passive and symmetrical
(or reciprocal) relationships. Let us take the passive sense first.
(piXoq in its passive sense could often be paraphrased by the passive
participle from (f)LXelv, that is to say ({)iXovp.evo(;. Its first meaning in
its passive sense is of people, where it means "dear" or "beloved,"
"regarded with" varying degrees of "affection." In Plato's Symposium
Socrates begins a speech by addressing Agathon as a; 0iXe 'Ayadcov
(199c3) and ends with oj (f)LXovn€vt 'Ayadieu (201c8). The second
meaning of the passive sense of 0iXo<; is as applied to types of activity
or pursuit, daiq, eptq—much the same as the second meaning of
<i)LXdvJ Thirdly, what is approved or valued for general reasons can
be called 4>iXop: the Muses at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis sang
OTTL KaXov, (piXov iffTi, TO 5' 01) KaXbu ov (piXov lariv (Theognis 17). At
various places in tragedy to oolov, to diKaiov, veoTrjq and aXKr] are
called 0iXa— general qualities valued for various reasons.® Once to
(piXov is a noun; the aged Oedipus is warned by the chorus not to
trespass in the grove at Colonus but to (}>lXov ae^ecrdai, to respect the
wishes, in fact the religious scruples, of his hosts the Athenians.^ This
application to general characteristics meeting with approval is close
to the third use noted before of the verb 0tXett'.
The parallelism between the uses of (piXelv and 0tXo(;-passive
continues in that 0iXo<;-passive is in the same way unusual in application
to particular impersonal objects. It is not infrequently found of
impersonal objects in tragedy, but always denotes a strong emotional
« Archilochus 114 (West); Simonides 542. 27-28 (Page).
' Od. VIII. 248-49; //. V. 891, I. 107.
« Eur.. El. 1351-52, Her. 637-38, Ion 481-82.
» Soph., O. C. 184-87.
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bond with or valuing of the object: ^iXt; Trarpiq, (t>i\ov dCofia are
common; Hecuba can call Hector's shield ^iXoj/, Philoctetes refers to
his To^ou (f)i\ov.^° But (piXov is not the word for any ordinary object
that one happens to like. People one likes, activities one pursues,
qualities one approves of, special objects one values emotionally, are
(f)i\a, but not ordinary objects one has a moderate liking for.
Let us turn now to a sense of (f)L\o(; which must be marked off as
logically distinct from the passive sense. This is the common meaning
which we translate as "a friend." Xenophon says iravroou KTjjuocTitiv
KpariffTov . . . (t)LXoq cra(l)Tiq Kal ayadbc, (Mem. II. 4). This cannot be the
passive sense of ^iXoc,. Xenophon does not mean "the best of all
possessions is a man one likes who is unfailing and good." We value
an unfailing friend not merely because we like him but also because
he will be prepared to help us. Under "friend" the Oxford Dictionary
adopts Johnson's definition "One joined to another in mutual benev-
olence and intimacy." Johnson derived this from Hobbes and Hobbes
from Aristotle on (/)iXiq; in Rhetoric II (1381al-2), but it remains the
standard English definition of "a friend," and it emphasizes a vital
part of the meaning of the term. Friendship is necessarily mutual
and constitutes a logically symmetrical relationship: if A and B are
friends then A is B's friend and B is A's friend; if A is a friend of B
then it follows that B is a friend of A. This is true of friendship in
Greek also, and in the sense in which it means "a friend" <j)i\oc, is a
logically symmetrical term, separate from both the active and the
passive senses. Now if friendship is thought to be based on any active
feeling or service felt by one party for another, then it must be
remembered that there will only be 2i friendship proper if the feeling
or service of the one party is reciprocated by the other One-sided
relationships do not amount to friendship. This is a matter of fact
which is reflected in the meaning of the words "friend" and (t>L\oq.
Xenophon in his chapters on friendship in Memorabilia II often
mentions reciprocity as a characteristic of friendly services: iroXXaKLq
a irpb avTOV TLq ov diijvvae, ravra 6 0iXo<; irpb tov (piXov e^rjpKeaev (II.
4. 7). I might add here that the ordinary Greek, including Xenophon,
thought in terms more of mutual service than of mutual aff^ection as
the basis of friendship. Xenophon never uses the verb (piXdu in
discussing the relationship between friends (the one occurrence is in
a matter of homosexual attraction"); the ordinary Greek word for
the attitude of mind of one (t>iXoc, to another is evvoia; this is stated
'" Eur., Tro. 458, /. A. 1229. Tro. 1222; Soph., Phil. 1004, 1128.
'
' This doubtless means that Xenophon reserved (fnXdv for fairly strong affection,
but still not the same as tpwq.
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by Aristotle and confirmed by usage (including a place in Menander's
Dyskolos).^^ So the apparent etymological link between (piXdv and
0tXo<; has disappeared in usage as regards (piXoc, in its symmetrical
sense. It is also worth saying that the symmetrical sense of ^iXo? in
the meaning of "a friend" is naturally unusual in the neuter, since
only persons can be friends; but it can arise in certain idioms (see
below).
The active sense of 0iXo^ may perhaps have been derived from
the sense we have just discussed. The title of "friend" is often
conferred or denied according to whether the "friend" gives active
assistance as he should, and this leads to relatively frequent occur-
rences of the word (t>iXoc, where the emphasis is on active manifestations
of friendship. From this kind of emphasis in what are uses of (f)i\o<;
in its reciprocal sense, there does seem to be derived a separate sense
of (f)i\oq which is exclusively active. This must be the explanation of
cases which resemble Eur. Tro. 789 avaideia (piXoq, which must mean
<i)LKo)v avaideiav, "making a practice of shamelessness" (cf. Hel. 1263).
Some apparent cases can be explained as cases of (piXoq meaning
"friend" but carrying an emphasis on the active display of friendly
service or affection. Others are genuinely "active" uses.'^
On the noun 0iXiq; we can be very brief. What must be remembered
is that it is the noun from (piXoq = "a friend," and not from the verb
</)tXeii/. (piXia is always used of mutual relationships of friendship or
alliance. If it is followed by what looks like an objective genitive, it
in fact means "friendship with," not "liking for"; Democritus fr. 98,
evbq (}>iXLt) ^vverov Kpeaacvv a^vueTu^v ttcuvtcou, says that friendship with
one wise man is better than friendship with all stupid men, not (as
Liddell and Scott suggest) that it is better to like one wise man than
to like all stupid men. One exception (outside the Lysis) is Plato, Rep.
581a, where 0iXia: tov Kepdovq, "love of gain," is attributed to the
part of the soul which is (f)iXoK€p5(q; this is an abnormal use dragged
in for the etymological play.'*
I have spent a lot of time on this purely philological inquiry for
two reasons; firstly, the main discussion in the Lysis is done almost
entirely by the use of the word (t)iXoq, now in one sense, now in
another. Let me give an example of the difficulties this can create
'2 Aristotle, E. N. 1 155b32; Eur., Ion 730-32; Plato, Prot. 337bl; Men., Dysk. 720.
'^ Examine //. XXIV. 775; Eur., Or. 424, Hipp. 91-93, El. 265. Occasional attempts
to deny this sense are largely misled by the inadequacy of LSJ. It is of course perfectly
obviously present in the Lysis itself.
'^ In Homer <t>i.\oTr)c, was a euphemism for sexual relations, but this disappeared
later, except in the Lesbian poets (see Page, Sappho and Alcaeus [Oxford 1955], p.
10) and Pindar. It has gone from tragic lyric.
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for the reader; at Lysis 219b we meet the formula <i)i\ov tov <i>i\ov to
<t)l\ov yeyovev. This could mean either "the friend is the friend of
the friend" or "the liking likes the liked" or "the liked is liked by
the liking" (what is liked is liked by what likes). In any given context
in the Lysis the reader has to decide for himself what is the appropriate
sense in which to take the present occurrences of 0t\o(;. This he can
only do by observation of the examples which are cited of the
relationship at present under discussion. This might seem to be mainly
a linguistic problem of dealing with the Greek text; but the second
problem raised by the ambiguity of the word 0iXo(; is of greater
philosophical importance. Plato's main philosophical question in the
Lysis is tl eariv to <I)l\ov; He is trying to define the concept of to
<f)L\ov. But which is the sense of to (f)iXov in which he is trying to
define it? Probably at least two concepts could be suggested to a
Greek by the expression to (t)i\ov; firstly taking (t)i\ov in sense I, the
passive sense, the general notion of "what is valued or pursued or
approved"—remember ottl KaXbu 4)i\ov taTi. Secondly (since the
neuter may also be used in Greek to express the concept named by
an adjective which itself only occurs in the masculine or feminine),
TO (j)i\ov could be derived from ^tXoq in sense II and denote the
concept of "friendship." Which concept is Plato trying to define:
"that which is the object of value or pursuit" or "friendship"? Again,
the reader can only answer this by careful observation of the discussion
Plato provides, and especially of the examples he describes.
The dramatic setting of the dialogue itself is a meeting of Socrates
with some young men at a gymnasium, one of whom, Hippothales,
wants to show off to Socrates his boy-favorite. Now this setting has
led many interpreters into thinking the dialogue is primarily about
pederasty; but this it certainly is not. The discussion starts with a
little homily delivered by Socrates to "humble" Hippothales' beloved
Lysis, who has been "puffed up" because Hippothales has been
singing his praises. This little homily is of the well-known Socratic
tone, recommending Lysis to learn his lessons well and acquire as
much knowledge as possible, since this is the way to make everybody
his friends;'^ the implication I think is that Lysis has been used to
'^ It is as erroneous to believe that Socrates really thought that Lysis' parents did
not love him, insofar as he was useless, as to believe that the Persian king would ever
have trusted him with his empire. Gregory Vlastos, in Platonic Studies (Princeton
1973), pp. 6-9, failed to allow for the exaggerations of this little homily—though
his main argument, as he saw, could be supported elsewhere in the Lysis, e.g. at 215b
and 217a sq. The problem remains acute. Plato clearly knew o/ unselfish affection,
but failed to account for it in his theory. See the final sections of this paper. D. K.
Glidden in Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), 39-59, is even more misled by this passage.
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acquiring "friends" too easily by his beauty alone. At this point Lysis
is rejoined by his boy-comrade Menexenus. The pair have already
declared to Socrates that they are friends, which they obviously are
in a quite different sense from any in which Hippothales and Lysis
are "friends." This perfectly genuine example of friendship between
the two boys is the real starting point of the main discussion. Socrates
appeals to them, since each has the other as a firm friend, to explain
to him how one man becomes the friend of another. (There is no
difficulty in seeing that so far ^tXog means "friend" throughout.)
At this point, 2 1 2a-2 1 3d, there follows a rather puzzling discussion
which many interpreters have explained away as a parody of contem-
porary sophistry. These interpreters may I think be partly correct in
guessing Plato's intention; but the argument is worth examination
for its own sake. Socrates starts by asking Menexenus "When one
man 01X5 another, which of them becomes the other's (piXoq; is the
one who (piXy the (piXoq of the (f)L\ovnevo(;, or is the (f)i\ovfi€voc, the
(f)i\oq of the one who ^iX?); or doesn't it make any difference?" After
our examination of the word cpiXoq it will be clear what kind of logic-
chopping can be made to arise from questions like this. What happens
is roughly as follows. Menexenus allows Socrates to interpret him as
believing that if one man (t>tXy another, then both are (f)iXoL. Menexenus
in fact is thinking of friends as always coming in pairs. But isn't it
possible, says Socrates, that one man may like another without being
liked in return? Ah well, they aren't friends {(piXoi) in that case, says
Menexenus. So unless they both like each other, says Socrates, neither
is a (t)iXoq. But what about men who are (t>iXLTnroL or ^lXolvol or
<j)LXbao<i>oL, asks Socrates. They like all these things— horses, wine,
wisdom— without the liking being returned; but surely all these
things are (jyVXa to them (that is to say "valued by them"). Oh yes,
says Menexenus. So to become a (fyiXoc, all you have to do is to be
liked, become cpiXovneuoq. But in that case if I am liked by a man I
myself hate, he becomes my enemy just by being hated by me, and
I become his friend by being liked by him even though he is my
enemy. But being friends with one's enemy is absurd and impossible.
The only remaining alternative then is that one becomes a ^iXoi; not
by being liked but by liking; and this leads to the same absurdity: I
might like someone who hated me, and that would not make us
friends. So now what can we say? Men are not 0iXoi because they
It is quite different arguing that a twelve year old may not want what is best for him
from arguing (Stoic fashion? or not even that) that to MKetov is an adult's unconscious
purpose. Much that Glidden proposes is suggestive, but not to be found in the Lysis,
and perhaps not in Glidden's form elsewhere in Plato either.
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like other men, nor because they are liked by them, nor because they
both like and are liked. This is a swift but I think accurate summary
of this bewildering passage. Many interpreters have alluded to the
play on the active and passive senses of 0tXo(;; von Arnim'^ quite
rightly pointed out that there is also play on the reciprocal sense, or
some of the statements would not be at all puzzling. Some more
recent interpreters have said that there is in fact no proof that those
who both like and are liked are not 0iXot, and have argued that the
whole passage is designed to prove that reciprocity is necessary in
friendship. But Plato does refute this too by showing that objects or
persons can be 0iXoi, meaning "liked," even if they do not return
liking. What in fact happens is that Plato first rejects an explanation
of the reciprocal sense of (piXoc, by pointing out that there is a passive
sense, then dismisses the passive sense by playing on the reciprocal
sense, and finally dismisses the active sense by the same play on the
reciprocal sense. Now this is "antilogical" with a vengeance; but it is
really a very adroit piece of logical manipulation of the ambiguity of
the word 4)iXo<;, so adroit that it is certainly a temptation to suspect
that Plato here at least must have had his tongue in his cheek. It
could doubtless be argued that construction of paradoxes to exhibit
ambiguities was a method invented by Zeno (though this is unlikely
to be true, in my opinion). It could be suggested that in the absence
of any technical terminology of logic, this kind of paradox-construc-
tion was the only way open to Plato of displaying such a notion as
that of symmetrical relationship. It might be, then, that we have here
a deliberate analysis of the meaning of the word (j)i\o(; constructed
by Plato himself by offering paraphrases of each sense of (f)i\oq in
terms of the participles from the verb (f)LXeiu. When Plato says (213c5)
(I firjre ol (t)L\ovvTtq, (piXoL eaovTat ixr)Tt ol (t>L\ov^evoL fir]Tt ol (piXovuTec,
T€ KOil (piXovfievoL, what we are to take him to mean is roughly the
opposite, namely that </)iXoi can mean either ({)LXovvT(q or (f)LXovnevoL or
(piXovvTeq re Kal 4>1'Xovix€vol.^^ This would be quite a workable schematic
analysis of the three logically distinct senses of <t)iXoc,.
It will be better if I say now that I do not myself believe that Plato
did mean this passage to be read in this way. If Plato was fully aware
of all the ambiguities latent in the word 0iXo^ we would expect him
to keep clear of them himself and steer the reader clear of them in
the rest of the dialogue. Whether he does so or not we must discover
by examining the succeeding discussion, and only then can we return
'® H. von Arnim, Platos jugenddialoge (Leipzig and Berlin 1914), pp. 42-44.
'^ I. M. Crombie draws back from adopting this view: An Examination of Plato's
Doctrines (London 1962), Vol. 1, p. 20.
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to decide upon this first section. All I want to add now on this passage
is this; there is one point of view from which Plato's rejection of all
his paraphrases of (l)i\o<; is justified. Each paraphrase could stand for
(l)i\(K, in one of its senses; none of them is the equivalent of (t)iXoc, in
all its senses. Now this is the point on which the construction of the
passage hangs, even if it is meant ironically. Each paraphrase is
rejected because another sense of (f)i\oq can be produced which this
paraphrase does not represent. The only reason for this can be an
assumption that cpiXoc, has some one basic meaning. If one is setting
oneself the aim of obtaining one single equivalent of (piXoq in all its
senses, then none of these suggestions will do and a negative conclusion
is justified. This is certainly Plato's ostensible aim here; and I think
it may also be his real aim. However, we must proceed to the rest of
the dialogue, which for a short time is less bewildering.
I shall summarize most of the argument fairly briefly, and omit
discussion of several interesting but incidental problems. First Plato
deals with two suggestions he derives from earlier writers, poets as
well as philosophers, about the nature of friendship. For the most
part it is clear enough that the section from 213d to 216b tackles tl
eaTLP TO (l>'Ckov as a problem about mutual friendship between men.
First of all we must see whether men who are like each other
—
onoLOi— become friends. But clearly bad men cannot be friends with
each other; so the suggestion seems only to be half true. But it may
have been meant that only good men were o^ioloi. because only good
men are consistent in their behavior. But good men cannot be friends
because of their likeness to each other (I cannot find any way of
acquitting Plato of shifting uses of onowq hereabouts), since a man
who is like another will not be able to do anything for the other
which the other cannot do for himself. So perhaps good men are
friends not because of their likeness to each other but precisely
because of their goodness. But goodness implies self-sufficiency, and
the self-sufficient man will not need friends, so even good men will
not be friends with each other.
So Socrates tries the other approach, and inquires (215c-216b)
whether men who are unlike each other are friends. Hesiod said
potter quarrelled with potter, and cosmologists have suggested that
opposites attract each other. But friends and enemies are opposites,
among others, say the avTiXoyLKoi; and the just man cannot be friends
with the unjust man, or the temperate man with the licentious man,
or the good man with the bad man. (This only shows that not all
opposites are friends, and not that all friends may not be opposites,
but Plato rejects "oppositeness" so presumably he was looking for a
single sufficient cause of friendship.)
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So far Plato has shown that neither good men nor bad men are
friends among themselves, nor can a good man and a bad man be
friends. Precisely these same paradoxical conclusions about friendship
are put into the mouth of Critobulus by Xenophon in Memorabilia
II; but in Xenophon the arguments used to establish these conclusions
are quite different from Plato's. What to infer from that I cannot
discuss for the moment.'^ The most important arguments to remem-
ber out of those put forward by Plato so far are those showing that
good men cannot be friends; firstly, that is, because in so far as they
are alike they cannot do each other any service, and secondly because
being self-sufficient they have no need of any help.
Now if there were only good men and bad men in the world, the
conclusions so far reached would have exhausted all the possibilities,
and friendship would be completely impossible. Socrates is now made
to put forward a hunch of his own (216d ff.). He suggests that there
are three yeprj, kinds, the good, the bad, and the neither-good-nor-
bad (this last I shall call the "intermediate" for short, though Plato
usually uses the full formula). The bad by its nature excludes itself
from all relationships; so we must look to relationships between the
good and the intermediate. Instances of these are as follows. Whereas
the healthy body does not need medicine, the body, which in itself
is neither good nor bad, needs medicine, which is good, when it is
threatened by disease, which is bad. Similarly—and this is a very
famous Platonic tenet— the wise man does not need wisdom so does
not philosophize, any more than the man who is completely sunk in
ignorance. But the man who is neither already wise nor completely
ignorant but can still recognize his own ignorance is the man who
pursues wisdom.
These are examples of relationships between the intermediate and
the good. These relationships are still described by Plato by use of
the word (t)iXov; and at 218b7 Socrates is made to exclaim vvv
apa . . . iravToc, naXXov e^r]vprjKanev o eanv to (f)i\ov Kal ov. But there
are beginning to be points which should make the cautious reader
pause. The example of the sick man's need of help at first suggests
that he will strike up a friendship with a doctor, but quite soon it is
no longer the doctor who is described as ^iXoq in this example but
the art of medicine which is described as (piXov. At 2 1 7a it is further
established that vyieia, health, is (piXov. This is not a way of saying a
'* It would be pleasant to be able to believe that Plato and Xenophon were
recording direct reminiscences of a discussion with Socrates, but this paradox may
have been or become fairly commonplace. It is equally unsafe to conclude that
Xenophon had read the Lysis, though of course he may very well have done. We
have no evidence for the relative dates.
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sick man needs to become the friend of a healthy man. This would
do him no good at all. What he needs is health itself. Now one cannot
be "friends with" health because only persons can be friends and
health is not a person. This should be enough to warn us that though
Plato is still discussing relationships which can be described in terms
of the word 0tXo(;, he is no longer describing relationships which are
themselves friendships even if it is thought to be implied that they
lead to friendships. Two points confirm this. Throughout the dis-
cussion as far as 221d-e all the relationships discussed are what may
be called "one-sided." Socrates' whole suggestion of a relationship
between the good and the intermediate is based on the premise that
the good attracts the intermediate. There is nowhere any suggestion
that the intermediate exercises a reciprocal attraction on the good;
so we may suspect that the relationship Socrates is thinking of is not
reciprocal. Finally, perhaps the most startling point of all is that
though ol ayadoi have earlier been shown not to be <))i\oL, not to be
friends, in this section first of all various ayada such as medicine and
health are called (t)i\a, and then at 220b7 the suggestion is resumed
(in some sense) that to ayadou is (i>i\ov. This can only avoid being
flatly inconsistent with the earlier conclusion if <i)i\ov is now being
used in a different sense.
There is an excusable temptation at this point to abandon the Lysis
altogether as a riotous muddle. But the situation is perhaps less
desperate than it may seem. From 216c to 22 Id the discussion is
perfectly clear and unconfused so long as it is read as an attempt to
answer the question ri eanv to (J)l\ov; taking ^iXoj^ in its passive sense.
This is an inquiry into what objects are 0iXa in the sense of being
valued or pursued or approved. I shall translate the question tl tuTLv
to (f)i\ov; in this sense as "what is the object of pursuit," since this I
think suits most of the examples Plato mentions. I hope to make
sense, then, of the rest of the dialogue by treating it as discussing
for most of the time no longer "what is friendship"? but "what is
the object of pursuit"? Even though the terminology seems un-
changed, the examples discussed force us to read it in this way. I
shall return later to the problem of why Plato gives us no warning
of his change of topic.
The passage from 218d to 220b is one of considerable interest
which I shall have to leave without detailed discussion. Plato suggests
that anything that is pursued must be pursued eveKa tov Kal 5ia tl—
for the sake of something and because of something; that is to say
for some further end and on account of some prior cause. This
introduces the means/end distinction, and Plato argues that there
cannot be an infinite regress of objects pursued as means, but that
David B. Robinson 75
some object of pursuit must ultimately be in view as an end. He then
attempts a rather alarming linguistic revision by claiming that only
the object pursued as an end is really "an object of pursuit," whereas
the objects said to be pursued as means to an end are only "objects
of pursuit" prjuaTL, in a manner of speaking. There is however a
close parallel to this in the passage at Gorgias 467-68, where it is
claimed a propos of the concept of ^ovXeadaL, "to want," that we do
not really want what we only want as a means; we only really want
what we want as ends and since the only things that are ends are
ayada, the only things we can really want are ayada. Plato in the
Lysis up to 220b develops his notion of the "object really pursued as
an end" without telling us what this object is, but then at 220b7
seems to suggest it might be to ayadov. Now various particular ayada
have been ruled out because they were only pursued as means (this
is jwt the same as in the Gorgias), so if some ayada are not (t)i\a but
TO ayaSbv is 4>'lXov perhaps we have to take to ayadbv here to mean
the quality of goodness itself as opposed to the good things in which
it is present.'^ The only further remark I want to make now about
this passage is that Plato states no reason why he should think, as he
apparently does, that there is only one object really pursued; his
regress argument proves not that there is oyily oyie end but that tliere
must be at least one end.^°
The last sections of the dialogue, from 221b to the end, become
alarmingly condensed; again I shall have to omit discussion of many
of the difficulties, to ayadbv is shown not to be the object of pursuit
by the device of imagining a world in which there was no evil. In
such a world there would be no need to pursue the good; but there
would still be objects which were pursued, such as food and drink,
'^
I leave this remark for the time being as it stands. I never intended to follow
those who find a fully developed Theory of Forms here. G. Vlastos {Platonic Studies,
pp. 35-37) has disposed of this view. Terence Irwin, on the other hand (in Plato's
Moral Theory [Oxford 1977], pp. 92-100), appears to believe that not only a irpwrov
<f)iXoi> but also a irpCoTov ayadbv is implied. That in itself is perhaps plausible, though
it is not the case, contra Irwin, that Plato in the Lysis says that e.g. health is not good
in itself. But in view of Plato's approach in Meno 87d-89a, Euthydemus 278e-281e
and Republic II. 357b-58a, it seems more plausible that for Plato the wpwrov ayaOop
would have been iin<TTr]ij.r} rather than (vbainovia. The difference of Rep. 357-358
from Aristotle, E. N. I. vii has often been observed. Even Gorgias fails to show Plato
calling evdaifiovia the trpwrov ayadbv. Plato perhaps recoiled from using ayadbv in a
sense in which it was manifestly incompatible with i^tXipoj'. I have argued this in a
paper still to be revised. I apologize for brevity here.
^^ Aristotle is accused of this same error in E. N. I. i and E. E. I. vii. In E. N. he
may be protected by various other arguments, e.g. that for a single science of TroXtri/c^.
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the desires for which can sometimes be neither good nor bad.^' So
the real cause of pursuit must be iindvuia, desire; now desire is for
what one lacks; one lacks what has been taken away from one; what
has been taken away from one is one's own, oUdov, so what one
desires and therefore what one pursues is that which is one's own,
TO oUdov. At this point Plato suddenly applies this conclusion to the
dramatic context and observes that since Menexenus and Lysis are
0tXoi they must be oUdoi. This new turn must rest upon the move
from ''to 4)i\ov is to olk^Xov" to "oi 0iXoi are ot/ceioi"; strict consistency
would require us to translate this move as that from "what is pursued
is what is one's own" to "people pursued are one's own (possessions)"
or perhaps "people who pursue each other belong to each other"
(strictly speaking, "as possessions"). But in fact of course ol <f)l\oL
eialv OLKUOL would be a normal Greek expression for "friends have
some affinity to each other," probably implying some congeniality or
matching of temperament. Now Plato no doubt meant this to be his
conclusion; certainly he goes on to suggest that oLKeioTrjq was such
that if one person was attracted to another by 0LKei6Tr](;, then since
oLKdOTTjc, is necessarily symmetrical the attraction must be mutual.
But the method by which Plato drags in this conclusion seems to be
no better than a step from 'Wb 4>'l^ov is oUeiov' to "oi 0iXot are
oi/cfiot" in which he changes not only the gender but also the sense
of both the words (f)L\oc, and oUeloc,. In particular the sense of oi/cetoq
in which a possession which has been taken away from one is oikuov
= "one's own," is not normally a symmetrical sense: my possessions
belong to me but I do not belong to them. So this part of the
argument really looks like a not strictly logical attempt by Plato to
return from the discussion of pursuit, during which the notion of to
oLKHov has entered in, to the discussion of friendship, where to oUdov
will provide an attractive solution if taken in a different sense. ^^ I
shall return to discuss this second change of topic. For the moment
let us finish the summary of the dialogue: the suggestion that oUdoi
are friends is tried out in two ways, firstly by equating oLKdoi with
oholol; but we already know that o/xoioi cannot be friends; then oUdoi
are equated with ayadoi; but we thought we had proved that ayadoi
could not be friends either.^^ So, says Socrates, here we are, three
^' And sometimes (presumably) not waiting to be caused by the bad.
^^ Stoic theories of oiKeiumc, seem to trade on more than one sense of UKeux;,
probably varying between symmetrical and non-symmetrical.
^^ There is very possibly also a rapid suggestion, not formally refuted, that the
good is (KKtiov to the intermediate. But if Plato took this seriously, he would have
been left with the continuing problem about reciprocity if he wished to apply this
sense of otwtOTTjq to the explanation of friendship. C. O. Brink, "Plato on the Natural"
(Han'ard Studies in Classical Philology 63 [1958], pp. 193-98) and Glidden fail to see
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friends, and we don't know what a friend is. outtuj 8€ otl (ctlv 6 (piXoq
OLoi re iyevofieda e^evpeiv. This is the regular conclusion to this set of
dialogues. Here the only softening of the failure is what may be a
hint that Plato thought something more could be done, where Socrates
says "I intended to bring one of the older people present into the
discussion" (223a 1). But I am not inclined to believe that Plato is
hinting that any adult reader can find an easy solution to all the
problems of the dialogue. Plato has left himself and us with real
problems.
In examining the course of the argument from 213d to the end
I have suggested that Plato is discussing two distinct topics: firstly
mutual friendship between men, and secondly, the pursuit by men
of things such as wisdom and health, or later, of food and drink.
Plato never gives any explicit indication that he thinks of himself as
changing at any point from one topic to another. He starts quite
clearly with friendship, but only the examples given at 217a-b and
218a reveal that he has moved to the topic of "pursuit"; and the
final return to the topic of friendship is extremely abrupt. This is
confusing for the English reader; and I am not sure that it was any
easier for a contemporary Greek reader, who could not clear things
up by translating the various senses of 0iXo(; into different English
words. But if we grant that Plato may have expected his readers to
follow all this, did Plato see a connection between his two topics? Is
"pursuit" meant to be closely relevant to friendship, or is this just
an informal chat which casually crosses from one topic to another
without insisting on logical relevance? I fancy it would be more
pleasing to find a unity of aim throughout the dialogue.
Here it will be helpful to turn to Aristotle. Aristotle in E. E. VII
and E. N. VIII and IX discusses friendship with a wealth of sociological
and psychological observation which is on a completely different level
from anything Plato was aiming at in the short compass of the Lysis.
But throughout his discussions Aristotle works rigorously within the
framework of a logical analysis which he presents at the beginning
of each of the versions. In the Nicomachean Ethics this framework is
stated at 1155bl7-1156a6. Aristotle observes briskly raxa 5' av
yevoiTo -jrepl avrOiv . . . (f)auepbv yvuipiadiVToq tov (fyCK-qTov: the problems
about friendship might be cleared up if we discovered what it is that
is (f)L\r]T6v, what it is that is liked or approved. The qualities which
attract liking, (f)iXr]<TLq, are to ayaBbv, to rjbv and to xPVf^i-t^ou. But to
XPWLfiou is only a means to one of the other two qualities, so it is
that Plato usually rejects the view that to oiKdov is ayadbv (though not, perhaps, the
view that to ayadbv is in some sense oikoov).
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the good and pleasant which attract liking as ends in themselves—
(f)L\r]Ta. av ei'rj rayadou re Kal to i]8v ccq reXtj. Then, to borrow a
sentence from the Eudemian version, "just as in the case of inanimate
objects we can like a thing for each of these qualities, so we can like
a man for each of these qualities" (1236al0-12). Aristotle is com-
paring our (t)iXr](nc, of impersonal objects with our (t>i\r](TLq of men; to
(f)i\r]Tbv, what attracts liking, includes the same qualities both in things
and in men.^'* Then, returning to the Nicomachean version, "there
being these three qualities which cause men to like what they like,
one does not talk about friendship in the case of liking inanimate
objects, because there is no returned liking. ... It is where good will
{tvvoLo) of person to person is mutual that there is friendship"
{(vvoiav yap eV avTiirtitovBoaL (})iKiav uvai, 1155a38). Aristotle thus
has the following account of friendship; we like men for the same
reason that we like things, because they have certain qualities. But
things cannot return our liking for them, whereas it is precisely this
mutual and returned "liking" which constitutes friendship between
men. So to explain the way in which friendships can spring up and
be maintained we must always investigate separately what reason
causes each one individually of a pair of friends to like the other.
Explaining why one man alone likes another does not show grounds
for talking of a friendship, unless the second also has a reason for
liking the first. There must always be 0iA?j(nq on both sides; each
party separately must be 0iXt7t6<; to the other.
This analysis of Aristotle's will give us a helpful means of assessing
Plato's discussion. Aristotle investigated to (PlXtjtov in both persons
and things before going on to concentrate on friendships between
persons: he believed in fact that (piXoL, friends, were pairs of (f)L\r]Toi.
Now TO (t)L\r}T6v is in fact Aristotle's equivalent for Plato's to <t)L\ov-
passive. Aristotle (in E. N., though not yet in E. E.) has used, and
perhaps indeed coined, an unambiguously passive verbal adjective
from (piXelv, and he has explained carefully the connection between
TO (t)LXr]T6u and (piXoL in the sense of "friends." Plato has not explained
any logical connections and has employed shifting senses of the same
word (i)iXov\ but if we apply Aristotle's logical analysis to the Lysis, we
can begin to see what may have been in Plato's mind in discussing
TO ^tXoj'-passive. Aristotle thought 0iXoi (friends) were ^iXt/toi; Plato
may have thought similarly that 0tXoi (friends) were 0iXoi in the
passive sense. So perhaps Plato made a general investigation of to
(J)lXov (passive) because he had in mind the same comparison as
Aristotle used between things that were <i>iXa and men who were
^^ E. E. does not yet have the helpful, because clearly passive, form ijuXijTbv.
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(piXoi (passive). This would explain why so much of the Lysis is about
the pursuit of things that are <pi\a (passive).
But here we must remember that Aristotle did not identify 0iXot
as (t)tXr]Toi without qualification; 0t\oi are pairs of men of whom each
has a quality which makes him (fnXrjToq to the other. Is this point in
Aristotle's analysis also present in Plato's mind? The answer I think
here must be no. The suggestion Plato sets out at the greatest length
about what might be (piXov (passive) is the theory that the good will
be 0iXoj/-passive to the intermediate; he mentions this as applied to
things. Perhaps by Aristotle's comparison this could be applied to
men, so that an intermediate man would be attracted to a good man.
But Aristotle would have asked: very well, and how is the good man
attracted to the intermediate man? To which Plato would have no
answer, since on the one hand only goodness is attractive, and on
the other the man who is already good is self-sufficient. Plato has
not, in his suggestion that to ayadov is cpiXou to the intermediate,
made any provision which would allow this one-way attraction to
become an element in a mutual friendship.
Now it may be that Plato was not after all investigating to <l)iXov
(passive) with a view to explaining to (j)iXov = friendship; but this
destroys the unity of purpose which we are trying to find in the
dialogue. It seems more likely that Plato does have part of Aristotle's
later framework in mind, that is to say he thought of <j)iXoL "friends"
as 0iXoi (passive), but that he did not keep in mind, as Aristotle did,
that friendship had to be based on mutual attraction and reciprocated
liking.
It looks very much as though Plato had not seen that this further
provision of Aristotle's was necessary because he had not attended
to the fact that ^tXog = "a friend" was a different notion and a
different sense of 4)lXoc, from 0tXo<;-passive. He rested on the assump-
tion that "friends" were 0iXoi in exactly the same sense as objects
could be 0iXa:, and that nothing more was needed for the explanation
of one sense of (piXoq than for the other. In view of the fact that the
word is the same in Greek, and also in view of the absence of any
recognition of the real dangers of ambiguity anywhere in Greek
thought before the Sophist, this is perhaps not too surprising. So
insofar as I have suggested Plato was making Aristotle's assumption
that friends were ^iXt/toi, or for Plato 0iXoi-passive, he was doing
this unconsciously because he had never seen the distinction, not as
Aristotle did, in order consciously to link friendship with the attraction
denoted by the verb of ^iXetj^.
At this point we must recall one problem that was left hanging in
the air. We must return to the question raised about the initial section
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of the discussion at 212b-2I3d. It might perhaps be argued that this
initial discussion is a deliberate analysis by Plato of the distinct senses
of the word (t)iXoc„ and that this was meant to act as a clue to the
reader by which he might follow the changes of topic and the
interrelations between the arguments in the rest of the dialogue. It
might be maintained that in suggesting one identification of 0tXot as
(j)L\ovuTeq T€ Kal (piXovnevoL Plato was showing himself fully conscious
of the symmetrical sense of 0iXo(; and the reciprocity of friendship.
The rest of the dialogue would then be intended for the careful
reader to sort out for himself; the value of the various suggestions
in application to different topics would be clear after brief thought.
In answer to this it can be said that the only reader to have used
the dialogue in this way appears to have been Aristotle. If these were
Plato's intentions, many learned commentators have missed the point
completely; only a few^^ have realized the full extent of the ambiguity
oi (t)iXoq, and none, even if they saw some of the elements of ambiguity
illuminated in 2I2b-213d, have applied what they learned there to
distinguishing the topics of the rest of the dialogue. Those scholars
who have succeeded in discovering the different senses of (f)iXoc,
underlying the discussion have very largely been following Aristotle.
If Plato did intend the Aristotelian framework to be discovered by
his readers out of his "ironical" construction of a casual conversation,
then surely (to apply R. Robinson's comment on this kind of view of
Plato's early dialogues) "the degree of irony thus attributed to him
is superhuman."^*^ If this was irony it took an Aristotle to see behind
it. If it is argued that a contemporary Greek reader would have been
much more sensitive to Plato's usage of (t>iXoq than a modern inter-
preter can be, against that must be weighed the advantage to a
modern interpreter of being forced to face the difficulties of trans-
lating (f)iXoc, into different words in his own language corresponding
to its various senses; furthermore modern interpreters should be in
general much more conscious than the Greeks were of the existence
of dangers to language and philosophy lying in ambiguity. The
difficulties of disentangling the strands of the Lysis might very well
have been greater to the average Greek reader than to us today,
even supposing the average Greek reader was likely in the first place
to think of words as able to have more than one sense. Finally, if
Plato was being ironical in first distinguishing the senses of (t>iXo<; and
^* Notably von Arnim (above, note 16).
^^ R. Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," Mj«</ 51 (1942), pp. 97 fF. =
Essays in Greek Philosophy (Oxford 1969), p. 32. My arguments here owe much to his.
Other views are, 1 think, implausible, however disappointing this may be. But there
are degrees of difference between unconscious transitions and radical confusions.
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then leaving it to the reader to follow the thread of the dialogue
without further signposting, it must be said that he constructed a
highly teasing maze for the purpose of this exercise. In ordinary non-
philosophical Greek contexts anything so elaborately puzzling as the
Lysis must have been rare.
The alternative interpretation of the connection between
212b-213d and the rest of the dialogue is that Plato genuinely
thought his first attempt puzzling and unhelpful, and rejected all the
suggestions contained in it; he then proceeded to discuss the question
TL eoTLv TO (t)iXov; with more attention to the facts of the matter and
less to what he suspected were purely verbal quirks. Even if Plato
had seen that 2 1 2b-2 1 3d was a sound analysis of the ambiguity of
the word 0iXoq, he might have thought it of no importance. In the
Euthydemus, when the ambiguity of navdavw has first been played
upon by the two sophists and then explained by Socrates, Socrates
goes on to observe (278b2) ravra d-q rOiv ixadrjtiaroiu (scil. irepl
6vonaT(j>v opdoTrjToq (277e4) iraLdta eoriv . . . iraibLav b\ \67aj bia Tovra,
OTL
€L Kal TToXXa TLc, 7] KoX TTcxPTa TO. TOLUVTa fMOcdoL, TO. ^uv TvpotyixaTa
ovbeu av nocWov eibeir} iry exfi, Trpoairai^eiv be oCbq r' av eirj rolq
audpoiiroLC, bia ttjv tCiv ovoixaroou bia<i)opa.v VTtoaKtXi^oiv koI avarp'fKOiv.
Discussion of the application of words is merely an entertainment,
7rat5ta, and does not show us to. Trpaynara iry e'xei, how things are.
Plato may similarly in the Lysis too have ruled out the possibility of
getting any help from verbal inquiry, and proceeded at 213e to the
serious task of finding out ri earcv to 4>'lXov; in the sense of discovering
as a matter of empirical fact what the phenomenon of friendship
consists in. 212b-213d, quite apart from the unsatisfactoriness of its
"antilogical" results, was only an attempt at purely verbal definition,
at attaching the name ^iXoq to one or other of three already recognized
classes of men. Plato may well have thought the real task was not to
bother about the application of labels to phenomena already distin-
guished, but to pursue the "real" definition of the factors which in
practice create friendships. If he discriminated between 2 1 2b-2 1 3d
and the rest of the dialogue in this way, it is possible to understand
how he may completely have disregarded the genuinely important
results of the first inquiry in his attack on the second.
In rejecting his first attempt at definition as purely verbal and
unimportant, Plato missed what might have shown him that there
were two separate phenomena to be investigated in his subsequent
inquiry, which could either be completely separated or given a
systematic relation to each other, but could not be completely assim-
ilated. One-way pursuit may be taken as a basic element in friendship,
but is not in itself a sufficient description of friendship, and in some
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cases may be of a kind which does not lead to friendship at all. In
his search for the one basic element making anything <t>i\ov, Plato's
earnest desire to be satisfied with no mere partial explanation led
him to miss a difference which exists in the phenomena as well as in
the words. As a consequence of this difference no one simple
explanation will be found, but either two separate explanations or
one complex explanation such as Aristotle's are necessary.
Now I might perhaps restate my view that Plato's aporetic dialogues
are not aporetic purely as a device of irony, but as a result of real
difficulties Plato got into over definition. His difficulties, as I hope
has emerged, are in the Lysis at least due to his not realizing the
dangers of ambiguity in his definiendum. I suspect this is also one
source of his difficulties over to au)(t>pov in Charmides, to oaiov in the
Euthyphro and over to KaXou in Hippias Major.^'^ I would suggest that
Plato on the best philosophical grounds actually led himself away
from any chance of recognizing ambiguity by his own admirable
insistence on not accepting partial definitions. It is true that a
definition covering only a few cases of a general concept is inadequate;
Plato therefore was anxious to obtain comprehensive definitions in
terms of a single necessary and sufficient condition expressed by a
statement of equivalence. His explicit statement of this requirement
of his methodology in the early dialogues is found at Euthyphro 6d-7a,
where Socrates insists that all ooia must have something in common;
/xia ibiOL . . . TO. oaia oaia, and accepts Euthyphro's suggestion that
this idea is to toXc, deolq Kpoa<l)iXeq only if this gives an equivalence
such that oaiov = Tolq deolq Trpo(X(t)LXeq. Such a requirement is difficult
enough to meet for a word having a wide range of strength and
weakness of meaning within a single logical sense, but quite impossible
to satisfy for a word such as (piXoq which has several senses each
having a logically distinct application. There are indeed moments
when Plato seems to hanker after not merely a single analysis, but a
single exact synonym for any definiendum.
This will no doubt have seemed an unduly arid exposition of
nothing but the logical confusions of a dialogue which contains a
number of interesting substantial arguments. I can perhaps add briefly
that underlying the logical confusions of the Lysis Plato seems to have
had a substantial difficulty about the nature of the good. Here of
course we have to make subjective guesses about which of his points
he placed most weight on; but at the final twist of the argument,
where Plato says "we thought we had disproved the notion that good
^' It may well be that Smov, aib^pov and koKov are ambiguous in very different ways
from (f>i\ov (and from each other).
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men could be friends," it has often been guessed that Plato thought
it really ought to be possible to prove that good men were friends.
This is quite likely; Aristotle certainly thought the highest friendship
was that between good men. But Plato has earlier in the dialogue
spent more time than on any other suggestion developing the idea
that the good is pursued by men because they need it, not having
yet achieved it. This too, although dismissed here, seems to be a
serious belief of Plato's; men for Plato only need to realize that the
true object of all their desires is none other than the good itself, and
then they will pursue this one true aim. But in this case Plato was in
a real dilemma, since basing pursuit of the good on the need for it
felt by the not-yet-good is precisely a theory which implies the self-
sufficiency of the already good, and so precludes friendship between
good men. I hope you will have seen that Aristotle took the logical
framework for his theory of friendship from the Lysis (not without
some clarification); on points of substance Aristotle chose to believe
in the friendship of good men at the cost of having to explain at
some length why the good man is not self-sufficient. But Plato was
at all times anxious to prove that our desire for the good was based
on our real natural need for it, and furthermore that attainment to
the good would be the full satisfaction of all our desires. This plared
him in the real, and not "ironical," dilemma, of not being able to
believe that men who had achieved goodness could continue to need
friends. Confused though the argumentation of the Lysis may be,
there are underlying it real problems about the part friendship can
play in man's pursuit of the good.
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